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Abstract: Philosophers of physics have long debated whether the Past State of low entropy of 
our universe calls for explanation. What is meant by “calls for explanation”? In this article we 
analyze this notion, distinguishing between several possible meanings that may be attached to it. 
Taking the debate around the Past State as a case study, we show how our analysis of what 
“calling for explanation” might mean can contribute to clarifying the debate and perhaps to 
settling it, thus demonstrating the fruitfulness of this analysis. Applying our analysis, we show 
that two main opponents in this debate, Huw Price and Craig Callender, are, for the most part, 
talking past each other rather than disagreeing, as they employ different notions of “calling for 
explanation”, and then proceed to show how answering the different questions that arise out of 
the different meanings of “calling for explanation” can result in clarifying the problems at hand 
and thus, hopefully, to solving them.  
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1 Introduction 
What facts call for explanation? While the notion of explanation itself has been studied for many 
years and is still a central topic of interest and research (Woodward 2014), the question of which 
facts call for explanation and what it means for facts to call for explanation—whatever we take 
“explanation” to mean—has been studied less (Baras 2019; Baras, unpublished; White 2005). In 
this paper we address this question, but instead of exploring in the abstract which facts call for 
explanation and what that implies, we study a case where this point is under debate. This case 
study will also illustrate how clarifying what calls for explanation in a particular case can help 
disentangle philosophical as well as scientific debates, thus contributing to making progress in 
them.  
The debate we shall address concerns a question at the foundations of statistical mechanics: is 
the so-called “Past State” posited in the so-called “Past Hypothesis” (both presented in the next 
section) in need of explanation? Two of the main proponents of each side of the debate, Huw 
Price and Craig Callender, have conveniently presented their views on the question of whether 
the Past State calls for explanation in a pair of papers (Price 2002; Callender 2004a) and repeat 
their arguments in a second pair of papers (Price 2004; Callender 2004b), and we will focus on 
the Price–Callender debate as our case study. One of the interesting outcomes of our analysis 
will be that Price and Callender are merely talking past each other rather than disagreeing.1  
We shall illustrate the fruitfulness of our analysis of “calling for explanation” by showing that 
the disambiguation can help us make progress in understanding whether the Past Hypothesis 
 
1 We present our reading of Price and Callender’s arguments. As is often the case, there may be other 
ways to understand them; we shall not discuss those, nor defend our reading, mainly since we take this 
debate as a case study for discussing more generally what calls for explanation. 
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calls for explanation, and consequently how one should proceed in studying and explaining this 
hypothesis, thus contributing towards providing tools for future work on the Past Hypothesis. By 
doing so we in no way imply that this exchange and our analysis of its nature and implications 
exhaust the entire discussion of the Past Hypothesis: we take from this debate only certain 
aspects that best serve our purpose of illustrating the notion of “calling for explanation” and the 
fruitfulness of clarifying it.  
As we show, the term “calls for explanation” and similar expressions are used to express distinct 
claims. While we carry out our analysis using the Price–Callender debate, we emphasize that the 
different meanings of “calls for explanation” identified here are applicable to other contexts as 
well.   
In Section 2 we present the Past Hypothesis; Section 3 disambiguates the notion of “calls for 
explanation”; In section 4 we analyze the claims made by Price and Callender applying the 
distinctions of the previous section; and in section 5 we demonstrate how the lessons of this 
paper will help us make progress in determining whether indeed the Past Hypothesis calls for 
explanation.  
2 The putative subject of explanation: The Past State 
The second law of thermodynamics says that the entropy of isolated systems cannot decrease 
towards the future. This law describes and generalizes regularities that are found in experience, 
and arguably the most important aspect of these regularities is that they are time a-symmetrical: 
the second law describes phenomena that are different towards the past than towards the future. 
Because of this nature of the phenomena described by the second law, it is taken to be one of the 
most important arrows of time. This law enjoys immense empirical support, so much so that 
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many people concur with Einstein’s famous saying that thermodynamics “is the only theory of 
universal content concerning which I am convinced that, within the framework of the 
applicability of its basic concepts, it will never be overthrown.” (Einstein 1970, p.33).  
At the same time it is agreed that the second law (as well as other laws of thermodynamics) is 
non-fundamental, in the following sense: since the matter, that behaves according to the laws of 
thermodynamics, fundamentally consists of the particles described by the fundamental theories 
of physics (e.g., the standard model and quantum mechanics2), it is usually assumed (or at least 
hoped) that the  regularities described in the second law can be derived as theorems of the 
principles of fundamental physics (or at least to be shown as compatible with them); this is the 
project of Statistical Mechanics.3 In this sense Statistical Mechanics is sometimes seen as a “high 
level theory” or, as Einstein (1919) preferred to call it, a “constructive theory” (where 
thermodynamics is the corresponding phenomenal “principle theory”).  
One of the main problems facing the attempts in Statistical Mechanics to derive a theorem that 
would explain and be the mechanical counterpart of the second law of thermodynamics is that 
 
2   Often, and here too, the discussion focuses on classical statistical mechanics (see e.g. Uffink 2007, 
Frigg 2008). We agree with Wallace 2001 and Ladyman and Ross 2007 that, since in contemporary 
science classical mechanics is considered strictly speaking false, the success of classical statistical 
mechanics should be explained by its preserving certain explanatory and predictive aspects of the 
contemporary theories. 
3 Introductions to the foundations of statistical mechanics, with an emphasis on philosophical problems, 
including an account of the Past Hypothesis, are Albert (2000), Hemmo and Shenker (2012), Shenker 
(2017a,b).  
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the fundamental theories of physics are time-symmetric.4 Since it is a point of logic that time-
asymmetric conclusions cannot be validly derived from time-symmetric assumptions (van 
Fraassen 1989), the second law of thermodynamics (even in probabilistic versions) cannot be a 
theorem of fundamental physics alone. To derive the second law, the fundamental theories of 
physics need to be supplemented with auxiliary hypotheses, the nature of which is under debate 
in contemporary literature (Shenker 2017b; Shenker 2017a).  
The debate concerning the auxiliary hypotheses is about two issues: one concerns the prediction 
of entropy changes beginning at any given point of time, that is: whether it can be proven that 
entropy increases as described by the second law; and the other concerns the retrodiction of 
entropy changes beginning (and going backwards from) any point of time, that is: whether it can 
be proven that entropy decreases towards the past as described by the second law. It turns out 
that in statistical mechanics those are distinct issues, that involve different kinds of arguments.  
The first debate is briefly this. According to the well-known “reversibility objection” (originally 
by Loschmidt; see Frigg 2008), to each entropy increasing trajectory segment in the state space, 
that starts at some given initial microstate and ends in the appropriate final microstate according 
to the equation of motion, there corresponds a “reversed” trajectory segment that starts at the 
microstate with same position as the final microstate but with reverse velocities, and leads to 
entropy decrease; and therefore prima facie a system is as likely to undergo entropy decrease as 
 
4 Examples include: (a) classical mechanics; (b) the classical theory of electromagnetism (see Allori 
2015); (c) the Schrödinger equation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics without collapse (On whether 
quantum-mechanical collapse, in the GRW version, can be the origin of thermodynamic time-asymmetry, 
see Albert (2000) and the criticism in Hemmo and Shenker 2001; 2003; 2005). Regarding the status of the 
T-asymmetry in the context of the CPT theorem, see Atkinson 2006. 
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entropy increase.5 Statistical mechanics attempts to solve this problem by noticing that the initial 
microstate is a member of a macrostate, in which most of the microstates are entropy increasing, 
and thus, at the macroscopic level, entropy is overwhelmingly highly likely to increase towards 
the future. This result is based, however, on certain non-trivial auxiliary hypotheses, concerning 
the dynamics (this is part of the debate around Maxwell’s Demon6), and the choice of measure 
by which probability is calculated (this is part of the debate around the so-called typicality 
approach7), both of which are needed in order to prove from mechanics a probabilistic 
counterpart of the empirically verified second law of thermodynamics. (For an overview of the 
standard views concerning the solutions of these problems see Frigg 2008.) 
The second debate is about the auxiliary hypothesis called the Past Hypothesis, and part of this 
debate is the case study we use in this paper to illustrate the question of “what calls for 
explanation”.  The nature, status and significance of the Past Hypothesis is the subject matter of 
an ongoing debate in the foundations of physics (Wallace 2017; Frisch 2010; Earman 2006; 
Loewer 2012; Hemmo and Shenker 2019 and forthcoming.), and in this paper we do not cover 
all the topics and ideas involved in this debate. Rather, as we said above, since we are interested 
in using it as our case study of “what calls for explanation”, we only focus on the debate on the 
Past Hypothesis in certain papers by Price (2002; 2004) and Callender (2004a; 2004b). We now 
provide some background for this particular debate.  
 
5 We do not discuss here the Poincare recurrence theorem, see Uffink 2007 and Frigg 2008. 
6 See Hemmo and Shenker (2010; 2012; 2016).  
7 See description in Hemmo and Shenker (2015); we return to this debate below.  
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The Past Hypothesis is an auxiliary hypothesis posited to solve a problem that arises due to the 
following well-known theorem in classical statistical mechanics.8 Suppose (as many believe is 
the case!) that the first above-mentioned difficulties are solved, so that there is proof, from the 
principles of fundamental physics together with some auxiliary hypotheses concerning dynamics 
and measure, that the entropy of typical systems in typical conditions are extremely highly likely 
to increase towards the future. Specifically, consider a proof that a system S that starts out at 
time t1 in a microstate that is within some macrostate M is overwhelmingly likely to evolve such 
that its entropy at a later time t2 will be higher, so that the entropy difference during the time 
interval t2–t1 is highly likely to be the positive 𝚫E. Then, it follows, as a corollary to the above 
proof, that as we follow the system from t1 backwards in time until t0 (where t2-t1=t1-t0), 
retrodicting its past states, it turns out that it is as highly likely that the entropy increases towards 
the past, so that the entropy difference during the time interval t1–t0 is highly likely to be the 
negative -𝚫E. In other words, the corollary is that it is highly likely that the entropy at t1 is at a 
minimum, with the entropies in both its future (at t2) and past (at t0) are equally likely to be 
equally higher; therefore we call it “the minimum-entropy theorem”.9 (See further details and 
implications in Uffink and Valente 2010, 2015.)   
One problem that the minimum-entropy theorem raises is that entropy increase towards the past 
is incompatible with our memories and other records, expressed and generalized by the second 
 
8 A similar theorem holds in quantum statistical mechanics if the underlying dynamics is understood to be 
time-reversal invariant. In this paper we focus on classical mechanics due to the context of the arguments 
that we address. 
9 Others call it “the parity-of-reasoning problem” or “the reversibility objection”, as in Frisch (2010) and 
Loewer (2012), or “the initial state problem”, as in Earman (2006, 401).  
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law of thermodynamics. Since these records form the confirmatory basis of the theories of 
physics, which in turn entail this minimum-entropy theorem, the theorem gives rise to a 
“skeptical catastrophe” (as Albert (2000) called it).10 To solve this problem, Feynman (1967, 
116) proposed that “it [is] necessary to add to the physical laws the hypothesis that in the past the 
universe was more ordered, in the technical sense, than it is today.” It is this hypothesis (to which 
other writers added some more details, that we do not address here,) that we call “the Past 
Hypothesis” and the state that it posits we call “the Past State”.11  
This Past Hypothesis raises a puzzlement (at least prima facie), which will be our focus in 
studying “what calls for explanation”. In standard statistical mechanics (in the Boltzmannian 
tradition12) entropy is associated with the Lebesgue measure of the macrostate of interest: the 
entropy of a microstate would be the Lebesgue measure of the macrostate to which it belongs. At 
 
10 Another problem, also solved by the Past Hypothesis, is that the sample space (that is, the set of 
elementary possible events, which is part of the probability space in the standard probability theory 
following Kolmogorov (1950)) is not sufficiently well-defined, since microstates that are compatible with 
the macrostate at one moment are deemed strictly impossible (and not only having zero probability) at 
another moment (but see Wallace (forthcoming) for a different understanding). 
11 A more recent and influential version of this idea is by Albert (2000, 96), who coined the term “Past 
Hypothesis”. For various versions and critical discussions of Feynman’s and Albert’s hypotheses, see 
Sklar (1973); Price (1997); Loewer (2001; 2012); Callender (2010); Wallace (2017); Hemmo and 
Shenker (2012); Earman (2006); Goldstein, Tumulka and Zanghi (2016). Albert’s Past State - according 
to his Past Hypothesis - is not only of low entropy, but must contain details that explain the particular 
macroscopic states of affairs throughout the evolution of the universe, thus supporting his notion of 
“records” and their reliability. 
12 For the Gibbsian tradition see Frigg (2008). We don’t address this view here, in which the problems 
that arise are different.  
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the same time, in some prevalent understandings of the foundations of statistical mechanics (e.g. 
Albert 2000), the probability of finding a system in a given macrostate (that is, in a microstate 
that belongs to a given macrostate) is also associated with the Lebesgue measure of that 
macrostate.13 The fact that the same measure is used for probability and for entropy leads to the 
following problem: the Past Hypothesis is the conjecture that the universe was (initially, or in the 
remote past,) in a state of extremely low entropy, that is, in a highly improbable state. To wit, 
among the various ways in which the universe could have started out (as far as physics is 
concerned), the actual way it came to be was a highly improbable one.  
Is the Past Hypothesis, thus construed, puzzling? Does the claim that the universe started out in 
the Past State, which is an extremely improbable kind of state, call out for explanation? What 
does it mean for the Past Hypothesis, and the Past State in it, to call for explanation? What are 
the possible ramifications if they do?  
In the general debates concerning the Past Hypothesis, these questions come up, sometimes more 
implicitly and other times more explicitly. Price (2002,2004) and Callender (2004a, 2004b) 
address this topic explicitly, providing important details for using the Past State as a case study 
for the question of “what calls for explanation”. We describe the Price–Callender debate in 
Section 4. In preparation, we distinguish in Section 3 between several different senses of “calling 
for explanation”.  
 
13 For the difference between the concepts of entropy and information and their respective measures see 
Hemmo and Shenker 2012, chaps. 6–7, and Shenker 2019. 
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3 What does “E calls for explanation” mean?  
When one claims that some purported fact or state of affairs “calls for explanation”, what 
precisely is this metaphor used to express? In this section, we distinguish between several types 
of claims that may be intended by such statements. How these can be applied to the Past State 
will be illustrated in sections 4 and 5.  
Let us begin with some clarificatory notes. First, these questions are distinct from the better-
known question of what constitutes an explanation. We remain neutral on this controversial 
issue.  
Second, sometimes the term “explanation” is used as a success term, meaning that if h explains 
e, h must be true. In this paper, we are often interested in hypothetical claims of the sort: <If h 
were true, then it would explain e>. Hence when we use the term “explanation” it is a shorthand 
for a potential explanation which may or may not be a true proposition.  
Third, there is a meaning of “calls for explanation” that we wish to set aside. Sometimes when 
one states that a fact calls for explanation, all that is being implied is that one finds the given fact 
surprising or especially interesting, and would very much like to know what its explanation is, if 
it has one. This affective sense of “calls for explanation” is not what philosophers argue about 
when they argue whether some fact calls for explanation. Therefore, the affective sense of “calls 
for explanation” is not among the meanings that we focus on in this paper.  
With these clarifications in mind, let us return to our question. Suppose we have some potential 
explanandum E about which people are arguing whether or not it calls for explanation. What can 
they mean by E calling for explanation? Let us look at three options (there may be more, but we 
focus on these because they are relevant to the Past State debate).  
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The options we explore are the following:  
(I) We currently lack an explanation of E.  
(II) It is possible to explain E. 
(III) We have reason to disbelieve theories that imply that E is without any explanation.  
We now elaborate on each of these meanings.  
(I) Sometimes when E is said to call for explanation, what is meant is primarily that we currently  
lack an explanation for it. Typically, the context is one in which we would  like to have one, for 
one reason or another. Explanations plausibly come in different degrees and kinds. Therefore, 
sometimes what may be meant is not that we don’t have any explanation for E, but rather that we 
lack a fuller explanation or a specific kind of explanation for E.  
Whether we possess or lack an explanation is relative to a set of assumptions and epistemic 
circumstances. There is more than one possible reason why we can lack an explanation. Suppose 
we have a set of background assumptions A. A is a set of propositions that serve as the 
background theory under which E is being examined by a given subject S at a given moment t. 
Assumptions need not be true, nor must they be believed.14 
 
14 For instance, A might include the Darwinian theory of evolution and S might work as a biologist but 
actually disbelieve this theory due to private religious beliefs of his. Yet, when S states during his lab 
work that some phenomenon calls for explanation, S means that that phenomenon is unexplained if the 
theory of evolution is assumed. 
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Case (Ia): A does explain E, but S has thus far (that is, up to time t) failed to discover how. In 
this case, E may call for explanation (given A) at time t1, but not at time t2; or for subject S1, but 
not for subject S2.  
Whether or not E has an explanation given A, and thus whether or not E calls for explanation in 
sense (Ia), can be a matter of controversy, in virtue of a controversy about whether some 
purported explanation really counts as an explanation for E. As an illustration, consider our case 
study of the Past State. It is sometimes claimed that (a) most of the microstates (relative to the 
Lebesgue measure) within the Past State macrostate are such that, when they evolve according to 
the mechanical equations of motion, they give rise to a world in which the second law of 
thermodynamics obtains; such microstates are said to be typical within the Past State; and (b) 
this typicality explains the fact that the second law obtains in our universe. Suppose that the 
background assumptions A, (endorsed by person S at time t), concerning the conditions that 
prevailed in the early universe as well as the way in which ‘typicality’ is to be determined, are or 
imply (a). Even given this supposition, there is a controversy concerning (b). Some writers think 
that typicality explains the thermodynamic nature of the universe; others think it does not. 
Among the former is Dürr (2001, p. 131), who emphasizes that the typicality itself explains the 
actual matters of fact; among the latter are Pitowsky (2012) and Hemmo and Shenker (2015) 
who emphasize that typicality is explanatorily relevant only to the extent that it amounts to 
probability.15    
 
15 These writers differ also on the way to determine whether a state is typical or not, that is, whether or not 
(a) obtains: Dürr (2001) and Goldstein (2012) think that the typicality of the initial conditions of the 
universe (or of a sufficiently isolated subsystem thereof) must be determined according to the Lebesgue 
measure of sets of microstates, justifying the use of the Lebesgue measure either on some a-priori grounds 
13 
Case (Ib): A is insufficient to explain E; Perhaps there is some further assumption A1 such that 
A∪A1 would be sufficient to explain E but A1 is unknown or unavailable to S at the moment. 
That A in itself doesn’t explain E is not a temporary matter of fact, nor one that depends upon 
S’s capabilities or state of knowledge at some given moment. Rather, it is a fact concerning the 
relation between A and E themselves: whatever “explanation” might be, A is not (or cannot give 
rise to) an explanation of E—for all times and for all persons.  
Case (Ic): A implies that E has no explanation. This can happen, for instance, if A includes the 
assumption <E is an explanatorily fundamental fact>.  It would then not only be the case that, 
assuming A, we have no explanation for E and never will have one, but rather, that assuming A 
there can’t be an explanation for E. This leads us to the next, modal meaning of calling for 
explanation.  
We provide further illustrations for cases (Ia–c) in the next sections. 
Suppose we conclude that E has no explanation, given A. In this case a further question arises. Is 
it possible to explain E? This is where the second meaning of “E calls for explanation” comes in.  
A second meaning of “E calls for explanation” is: 
(II) It is possible to explain E.  
 
or by its roles in some theorems in mechanics; while Hemmo and Shenker (2015) show that these roles 
are irrelevant for the use of the Lebesgue measure to determine typicality, as well as probability in our 
context. A similar debate arises in the context of Bohmian Mechanics, see Hemmo and Shenker 2015. 
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Typically, we would say that E calls for explanation in this sense if it is the case that we not only 
want E to be explained, but we also think that attempts to find such an explanation may be 
successful. We distinguish between three types of such modal claims.  
(IIa) The first type of claim involves a metaphysical modality. As before, whether E can be 
explained is relative to a set of assumptions. The claim that it is possible to explain E amounts to 
the claim that, given a set of assumptions A, it is possible (metaphysically, or conceptually) that 
E has an explanation. In this sense, to deny that E calls for explanation amounts to the claim that 
A entails that E has no explanation (case (Ic) above).  
(IIb) The second type of claim is about our epistemic prospects. If it is possible for E to have an 
explanation, we may wonder whether it is possible for us to ever learn, or at least gain some 
justification for believing, some particular explanation for E. Sometimes, when we claim that E 
calls for explanation, part of what is being claimed is that it is epistemically possible for us to 
learn in the future (or gain some justification for a belief about) what the explanation for E is. It 
may be that even if E has an explanation, we have no way of learning what it might be, due to 
our epistemic limitations. Whereas (IIa) was about the relationship between E and A, (IIb) is 
more focused on the person S who is trying to explain E.  
(IIc) The third type of claim is practical. Although it is not, strictly speaking, a disambiguation of 
(II), it is another claim in the vicinity that is sometimes mixed up with the previous two types of 
claims. If E is such that we currently lack an explanation for it (given A), and it is such that it 
might have an explanation and that the explanation may be discoverable, a further question to 
ask is the practical one, namely, whether it is worth our while to try and discover it. Some facts 
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may be too trivial (or to lack any importance for any of our purposes) to deserve allocating 
resources to investigate them. Let us call this sense of “calls for explanation” the practical sense.  
We provide examples for (II) below, based on our case study. 
A third meaning of “calling for explanation” is:  
(III) We have reason to disbelieve theories that imply that E is without any explanation.  
Since we believe that this is the main sense of calling for explanation that Callender (2004a, 
2004b) has in mind, and since this sense is a bit less straightforward than the previous ones, let 
us present it by generalizing intuitions about a paradigmatic example.  
Suppose a seemingly ordinary coin is tossed many times and lands consistently in the alternating 
sequence HTHTHTHTHT… (H=heads; T=tails). If we initially assumed that the coin was an 
ordinary one and that the tosses were independent of one another, we would intuitively feel not 
only surprised but possibly uncomfortable. The intuition is that something is wrong about our 
assumptions. We should therefore revise our assumptions and believe that the tosses are 
dependent and that for each toss there is some mechanism or human manipulation that makes the 
coin land on the opposite side of the previous toss. This is what we should do if we were fully 
confident that the event occured, that is, that indeed a coin was tossed and landed in this 
sequence. If, however, we were less confident, for example if rather than seeing the coin being 
tossed an acquaintance told us about this coin, it might make more sense to just disbelieve the 
acquaintance that the event occured.  
How might we generalize the example? A popular suggestion is that there is a property that some 
facts have, sometimes referred to as strikingness, that gives us reason to expect them to have an 
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explanation (perhaps a special kind of explanation).16 In our example, suppose that the fact that 
the coin landed in the alternating sequence (call this fact E) is striking; and call our assumptions 
(that the coin tosses are fair and independent) A. In this example, given the background 
assumptions A it seems that fact E has no explanation (or at least not an explanation of the right 
kind). Statement (III) above is that this situation is unacceptable, and therefore we must change 
it in one of two ways: either we disbelieve A, or we disbelieve E. Concluding that the tosses are 
dependent would be an example of rejecting the background assumptions A (and accepting an 
alternative set of assumptions A′, e.g. the tosses are dependent, that does not imply that E has no 
explanation). Rejecting the unexplained statement E could amount, in this case, to holding that 
the sequence—the purported explanandum—never occurred. For example, if a friend told you 
about the coin, you have a good reason to doubt that the friend was telling the truth. Let us call 
this sense of “calls for explanation” the epistemic sense since it implies that there are reasons for 
belief or disbelief.  
 
16 In other contexts, this idea is used to support far-reaching conclusions: that our universe was 
intelligently designed (van Inwagen 1993; White 2018; Manson 1998), that there are many universes 
other than the one we inhabit (Leslie 1989; Parfit 1998), that our universe is teleological in some non-
theistic way (Mulgan 2015; Nagel 2012), that there are no mathematical (Field 1989) or normative mind-
independent facts (Street 2008) and even that our knowledge of first-order logic is faulty (Schechter 2010; 
2018). 
There is a theoretical question here whether the claim is just that E must have an explanation, or a 
stronger claim, that E must have a particular kind of explanation. For the purposes of this article, the 
distinction won’t come into play because the debate has thus far focused on the weaker claim, that we 
should expect the past state to have an explanation at all. This usage of “calling for explanation” will be 
explored in depth in a book that Dan Baras is in the process of writing. For preliminary discussion, see 
Baras (2019) and Baras (2020).  
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We have described in total five meanings of “calls for explanation”. In the next two sections we 
will see how these apply to the Past State.  
4 In what sense might the Past State call or not call for explanation? 
With these distinctions in hand, we can approach the past-hypothesis debate and see in what 
sense the disputants claim that the Past State does or does not call for explanation. As we said, 
our case study will focus on the published debate between Price and Callender. We stress once 
more that it is not our goal to interpret Price and Callender’s particular arguments per se. As is 
often the case, their precise views may be interpreted in more than one way, and we present here 
one possible such interpretation, having in mind our main goal, which is using their exchange as 
a means to learn about calling for explanation.  
When Price started advocating the view that the Past State calls for explanation, in his 1997 
book, Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point (pp. 22–48), his main claim seems to have been that 
the Past State calls for explanation in the first sense (I), that is, that at the time he wrote his book 
we simply lacked an explanation for it. His claim is contrastive, as he sums it up at the end of the 
book: “What needs to be explained is the low-entropy past, not the high-entropy future” (p. 262). 
The fact that entropy was low in the past is what we lack an explanation for, whereas the fact that 
entropy has been increasing ever since is (assumed to be) well-explained by statistical 
mechanics. Callender, in his 2004 papers, does not deny that as things stood at the time he wrote 
these papers the Past State was unexplained. Thus, if there is anything that is being debated, it is 
not that the Past State calls for explanation in sense (I).  
Consider now the following quote from Price’s later article:  
18 
Would it really be plausible to suggest that physicists should sit on their hands and not 
even try to explain it?... [T]he issue is whether it is appropriate to try. (Price 2002, 115)17  
The claim presented here is a practical one: It is worthwhile for physicists to try and come up 
with an explanation of the Past State. The claim is that they should devote their time and other 
resources to this project.18 In our list above, it is of type IIc. As such, it only makes sense if you 
first assume that we don’t currently have an explanation for the Past State (I), that it is possible 
for this state to have an explanation (IIa), and that it is possible for us to discover the explanation 
(IIb). Price, at least in this quote, seems to think that it is this practical claim that is being 
disputed by his opponents.  
Is that correct? Consider the following quote from Callender, one of Price’s main disputants. In 
this quote Callender turns to compare the case of the Past Hypothesis with a case concerning the 
so-called “standard model” in particle physics. We do not need to go into the details of this field 
of physics and of its standard model, and for our purposes suffice is to follow Callender in 
bringing into our discussion this case and noticing the similarities which he thinks are important. 
As Callender describes, some physicists feel that certain elements of the “standard model” are 
ad-hoc, and there is an ongoing debate on whether these elements should be endorsed as “brute 
facts” or whether they call for explanation. Callender asks: 
[I]s everything to be explained? Will all models of the universe be deficient until physics 
answers why there is something rather than nothing? Surely that is too strong an 
 
17 Price (2004, 230) repeats this claim using similar wording. 
18 Note that this was probably what Price intended to imply in the 1997 book as well, though he isn’t 
explicit there. Otherwise, what is the point of his argument that the Past State is currently unexplained?  
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explanatory demand to impose on physics. Again [as with the Past Hypothesis; DB&OS] 
it seems to me that it’s perfectly within the rights of the physicist to find something ugly 
about the standard model and want to devise an alternative without so many knobs. When 
that alternative exists and is shown to be empirically adequate, we can then compare the 
two. It may well be that it is superior in various empirical (one would hope) and 
theoretical ways... Similarly, knowing beforehand that the Past Hypothesis needs 
explanation seems too strong. (Callender 2004b, 248) 
While Callender clearly claims that we don’t know in advance whether the Past Hypothesis has 
an explanation, he concedes that it is possible that physicists will be able to either come up with 
such an explanation, or devise a better theory without the Past Hypothesis. That means that he 
believes that it is possible that the Past State has an explanation (IIa) and that it is possible that 
we will discover the explanation (IIb). He doesn’t go here as far as to say that it is a worthwhile 
project to try and discover this explanation (IIc). However, once he made the other two 
concessions, it is difficult to reject the claim that it is worth the effort.  
And so, the question arises: when Callender argues that the Past State doesn’t call for 
explanation, what precisely is he claiming? In light of the above, what he must be disputing is 
that the Past State calls for explanation in sense III, the epistemic sense.19  
Consider the following quote, in which Callender summarizes his conclusion:  
I urge the view that it is not always a serious mark against a theory that it must posit an 
‘improbable’ initial condition [e.g. the Past State]. (Callender 2004a, 195) 
 
19 Craig Callender confirmed our interpretation in personal correspondence. We thank him for that.  
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The quote suggests that indeed his claim is that the Past State doesn’t call for explanation in 
sense III. Callender’s imagined interlocutor believes that it counts against a theory if it includes 
the Past Hypothesis and implies that the Past State is a brute fact. The interesting thing is that, 
although Callender’s articles are presented as responding to Price, Price, to the best of our 
knowledge, nowhere endorses the view that Callender is arguing against. Callender’s claim is 
that the Past State doesn’t give us reason to reject theories that leave it unexplained. He also 
clearly thinks that improbability is not a sufficient condition for something to call for explanation 
in this sense. At times he seems to be making a stronger claim, that boundary conditions never 
call for explanation (in sense III). At other times he makes an even stronger claim, that nothing 
calls for explanation (in sense III). We discuss some of his arguments in the next section.  
Let us now consider what we’ve learned by getting clearer about what it means for something to 
call for explanation. We’ve learned that Price and Callender, who seem to be arguing about 
whether the Past State calls for explanation, may be talking past each other. Price argues that the 
Past State calls for explanation in senses I and II(a–c). Callender accepts these claims, but argues 
that the Past State doesn’t call for explanation in sense III. Price, as far as we can tell, never 
claimed that it does call for explanation in this sense.  
This is not the only case in which writers talk past each other; and so, noticing this fact is not our 
main point here. Our main task is to disambiguate the notion of “calling for explanation”, and the 
discovery of the nature of this exchange is the first outcome of this project. The second—and 
more important—outcome is that it may help to make progress in the debate around the Past 
Hypothesis, as we illustrate in the next section. 
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5 So, does the Past State call for explanation? 
By now it is clear that in order to answer the question of whether the Past State calls for 
explanation, we must ask ourselves what sense of “calling for explanation” do we mean. We 
have distinguished five different senses in which the Past State may call for explanation, and we 
shall now examine each in turn, describing briefly how the Past State is, or can be, addressed in 
its light. This account is not meant to be exhaustive: we bring only examples that illustrate how 
the disambiguation presented in this article, concerning the notion of “calling for explanation”, 
can help us resolve debates concerning the Past State, thus demonstrating how it can be applied 
in other cases as well. 
a. Do we currently possess an explanation for the Past State? (I) 
Usually, the Past State is taken to be a fundamental postulate in statistical mechanics (Feynman 
1965, Albert 2000).20 As usually thought of, statistical mechanics comprises of mechanics 
(classical or quantum) together with some auxiliary hypotheses, one of which is the Past State 
hypothesis, and in this theoretical context, this hypothesis cannot be explained from within the 
theory in a non-circular way (Shenker 2017a,b). In section 3 we presented Case (Ib) in which E 
is not explained by the set of assumptions A because A is insufficient to explain E; and this is the 
case here: mechanics by itself is insufficient to explain the Past State, and so the Past State must 
be added to it, as an auxiliary hypothesis. 
 
20 Hemmo and Shenker 2019 argue that it is not fundamental but derivative, but not from mechanics by 
itself, but from some contingent facts concerning the physical basis of our mental states. We do not 
address this idea here, and we focus on the standard understanding of the status of the Past Hypothesis. 
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However, we also noted, in presenting Case (Ia), that it may be that E is not explained, at the 
time of interest, by the set of assumptions A because at that time S doesn’t know how to 
construct the explanation of E based on A. This type of case is useful to understand the state of 
the art, if the set of assumptions A is adjusted as follows. Physics is a collection of theories (with 
complex relations between them), and one may attempt to explain the Past Hypothesis by 
embedding statistical mechanics within a broader theory, or adding another theory to it (we are 
not committed to any theoretical structure here). The key is to identify which parts of physics 
comprise the relevant set of assumptions A, and then to construct the explanation of E on their 
basis.  
An example is the proposal of Carroll and Chen (2004) and Carroll (2010). These writers offer a 
conjecture about the structure and dynamics of the universe in the framework of general 
relativity theory, according to which the ontology is one of a multiverse, in which fluctuations 
give rise to “baby universes”. The initial state of the parent universe is of high entropy, and the 
details of the proposed model entail that it is likely that a baby universe that starts off in a low 
entropy state will be generated. While without this model the Past State seems to be unlikely, 
within this model it becomes likely and, arguably, thereby explained. In this sense, whereas A 
(i.e. mechanics) does not explain E (i.e. the Past Hypothesis), an extended set of assumptions 
A∪A1 (including general relativity and some specific assumptions) may explain it (see critical 
discussion in Winsberg 2012).  
Do we have good reason to believe that Carroll’s conjecture is correct? That is a different 
question. We will return to it shortly.  
23 
b. Is it possible that the Past State has an explanation? (IIa) 
The fact that some explanations for the Past State have been suggested, such as Carroll and 
Chen’s proposal mentioned above, is a reason to believe that, whether or not their explanation is 
correct, it is at least possible that some explanation of the Past State exists. Is there, then, any 
reason to believe that the Past State cannot have an explanation? Callender (2004a, 198) 
mentions the following argument which, if sound, would establish the impossibility of explaining 
the Past State: If (1) an explanation of a state (in the above sense) must contain an earlier state, 
and if (2) the Past State is an initial state of the universe, meaning that there was no earlier state, 
then the Past State cannot have an explanation. Callender does not believe this argument is sound 
because he rejects premise (1).  
Explanations that turn to earlier states are usually causal explanations. There is a variety of 
notions of causation,21 and one of the conditions often mentioned as being part of a causal 
relation is that of temporal order: the cause is supposed to precede the effect (see Frisch 2014). 
Having in mind this kind of explanation may underlie premise (1). Notice, however, that not all 
causal explanations assume this temporal structure. (For example, see Faye (2018) on backwards 
causation, and Menzies (2017) on counterfactual theories of causation). Considerations that 
emphasize a temporally symmetrical structure of the universe may militate against this line of 
thinking. Indeed, the very idea that the Past State is initial (or in the past) rather than final (or in 
the future) already assumes a temporal asymmetry. Callender, following Price’s (1997) lead, 
 
21 There is also a debate on whether there are causal relations in the world at all, according to science 
(especially physics), and if so, what are they. See for example Russell (1913), Norton (2007, 2009), 
Cartwright (1983, 2004), Ben Menahem (2018). 
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objects to the second premise of the argument on the grounds that it makes the concept of 
explanation time-asymmetrical, and, given that our best theories of physics are time-
symmetrical, we should not require our explanations to have such a time asymmetric property. 
Such time asymmetries exemplify what Price has called a temporal double standard.  
While Callender rejects the previous argument, he seems to accept a modified time-symmetric 
version of it. According to this version, the Past State is a boundary state of the universe, rather 
than an initial state, and then he proceeds to say that boundary states cannot have explanations. 
Why can’t a boundary state have an explanation? According to one standard thought on this 
matter the maximum that can be said is this. Mechanics is based on differential equations which 
require some so-called “initial conditions” in order to yield solutions, but the term “initial” here 
should not be misleading: any condition that is compatible with whatever empirical knowledge 
we have concerning the state of affairs that prevailed at some (any) point of time are 
acceptable.22 The requirement of empirical adequacy with whatever we know the facts to be at a 
given point of time is the maximum that can go into the “initial” conditions, since they provide 
the fullest explanation that the theory of mechanics can provide. Whether or not this constraint 
amounts to “explaining” those initial conditions is a point we leave open. Moreover: as we shall 
discuss shortly, the notion of boundary conditions may be expanded if the universe is described 
using other theories, e.g. within cosmological models such as those by Carroll and Chen (2004) 
and Carroll (2010). These considerations illustrate that whether or not boundary states can have 
 
22 Hoefer 2002 builds on this insight to clarify the notion of “determination” associated with the problem 
of free will. 
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explanations depends on what it means for a state to be a boundary condition, and what 
constraints go into determining it.  
Moreover, while some authors indeed think of the Past State as necessarily being an initial state 
(Albert 2000, 96), this is not universally agreed. Recall that the Past Hypothesis is meant to 
provide a temporal symmetry breaking in order to fit our memories and other available records, 
that tell us that the entropy in the past was lower than it is now. If so, then it may suffice to say, 
as Feynman (1967, 116) does, that “it [is] necessary to add to the physical laws the hypothesis 
that in the past the universe was more ordered, in the technical sense, than it is today.” (our 
italics). “The past” here needn’t necessarily be the remotest past, i.e., the initial state of the 
universe, and for the same reason, it need not be a boundary state. By contrast, a low entropy 
Past State that is not initial may be problematic in a sense pointed out by Albert (2000), since in 
that case the records that should justify beliefs concerning the state of affairs between the low 
entropy Past State and the initial state (which may in this case have higher entropy) may not be 
reliable, and lead to a “skeptical catastrophe” within the scientific theories that describe the early 
universe (Albert 2000, Ch. 6); and for this reason Albert prefers the Past Hypothesis to say “that 
the world first came into being in whatever particular low-entropy highly condensed big-bang 
sort of macrocondition it is that the normal inferential procedures of cosmology will eventually 
present to us” (Albert 2000 p. 96). 
Once again, the possibility of explaining the Past State is illustrated by the model of Carroll and 
Chen (2004) and Carroll (2010), mentioned in the previous subsection. This model provides an 
explanation of the Past State of the universe in terms of another state of the multiverse, which 
“precedes” it albeit not in the temporal sense of the term: the Past State is explained as the state 
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in which a “baby universe” is created in the “parent” universe, at a moment which is initial for 
that baby universe. Does that make the Past State a boundary state of our baby universe? Or does 
the fact that it is explained by a “preceding” state make the Past State not count as a boundary 
condition? Notice that Carroll’s model assumes that the universe (of which our universe is but a 
fluctuation), in turn, started out in some state (namely, a high entropy state in the appropriate 
sense of the term) within which the fluctuation that “creates” our “baby universe” is described. 
Within that model the claim is that the high entropy state has high probability. How should this 
probability be determined, and does this high probability mean that it does not call for 
explanation? That high entropy state is, too, a boundary condition within the expanded 
theoretical context; Can that boundary condition be explained? Should it be explained? These are 
conceptual questions that we leave open.   
c. Should we expect to discover an explanation for the Past State? 
If it is possible for the Past State to have an explanation, the initial presumption should be that 
we might be able to learn about it. To be sure, there are reasons to have low expectations, that is, 
to have low credence in the claim that we will one day discover the explanation of the Past State, 
even if one exists. Knowledge after all requires epistemic justification. It might be impossible to 
have substantial enough or even any evidence of what happened before the Past State (as noted 
earlier, “before” here may be in a non-standard sense). Such a state is so incredibly distant from 
our epistemic reach. Callender raises this issue when he, inspired by Hume, argues that:  
[S]ince the cosmos happens only once, we cannot hope to gain knowledge of any 
regularities in how it is created. This, I take it, implies that we will not be able to defend 
any grand principle of how contingent matter–energy sources are distributed at the 
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boundaries of the universe, for what justification would we ever have for such a 
principle? (Callender 2004b, 246) 
However, Callender’s argument is questionable. It is not clear why the fact that the cosmos 
happened only once implies that we can’t gain knowledge of how it came about. It might follow, 
if the only possible way of learning about the origins of our universe is by enumerative 
induction. But why think that this is the case? The assumption, prevalent perhaps in Hume’s 
days, that enumerative induction is the only legitimate form of ampliative reasoning, is no longer 
common ground. Inference to the best explanation, for instance, is considered by many to be an 
independent form of rational inductive reasoning. To take a familiar example, we can have 
justified beliefs about subatomic particles even though we cannot observe them and thus cannot 
learn about them via enumerative induction (Harman 1965, 89; Weintraub 2018, 191).  
We see no reason to rule out the possibility that, if the Past State has an explanation, then we will 
one day discover what it is. However, while we do not think that it is impossible to gain such 
knowledge, Callender may be right that the prospects of gaining knowledge of such a remote 
occurrence are dim. It is worth distinguishing though between the question of this section, 
whether we can ever know an explanation of the Past State, and a different question, whether 
there is any benefit to coming up with possible conjectures.23 Even pessimists about our ability 
to gain knowledge about the origins of our cosmos should admit that we can come up with 
possible theories which, if true, would explain the Past State and for which we may never have 
enough justification to fully believe.  
 
23 Smolin (1997, 5) for instance, presents his work as mere speculation. Although, he seems to think of his 
speculation as a step towards discovery, the possibility of which he seems optimistic about. 
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We note in this context that it could be an interesting project to figure out what restrictions there 
might be on good speculation. While significant epistemic justification is not a necessary 
requirement for good speculation, it is implausible that any theory that accommodates the data 
counts as good speculation. Plausibly, for a conjecture to be good, it must have some explanatory 
virtues.  
d. Should we try to discover an explanation for the Past State? 
If it is epistemically possible that we can discover an explanation of the Past State, even if 
improbable, then why not try? Of course, perhaps it is more important that scientists spend their 
time and money finding solutions to the climate crisis than on inquiring into the distant origins of 
our universe. However, setting such considerations aside, we concur with Price that “Should 
physicists sit on their hands, and not even try to explain it? They might fail, of course, but that’s 
always on the cards—the issue is whether it is appropriate to try” (Price 2004, 230). Physicists 
should try. Why not? 
e. Is the Past State such that it gives us reason to reject any theory that implies that it is a 
brute fact? 
Claiming that the Past State calls for explanation in sense (III) amounts to the claim that we have 
reason to reject any theory that both includes the Past Hypothesis, and implies that the Past State 
is a brute fact. Examples would be people who claim that we should not believe that our universe 
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is the only universe that exists, as opposed to a multiverse, or that the Past State is the initial state 
of our universe, because those theories would imply that the Past State is a brute fact.24  
 The mere fact that a theory leaves some unexplained facts or even implies that some facts are 
brute, is—according to many thinkers—not a reason to reject a theory.25 Arguably, the ultimate 
explanation of our universe must include some fundamental facts. However, are there reasons to 
believe of certain facts that, even though we do not possess an explanation for them, we should 
be quite confident that they are not fundamental? Whether there can be such reasons for belief 
and whether they might apply to the Past State is a worthy research project.26  
Winsberg attributes to Carroll the following view:  
[A]ny initial state of the Universe that is unlikely on [a natural a priori] measure requires 
explanation… Carroll rejects the Past Hypothesis on the above grounds. (Winsberg 2012, 
396) 
 
24 The claim of Hemmo and Shenker 2019, in which the arrow of time is reduced to contingent local 
spatial asymmetries in the brain, is not an explanation in terms of “brute facts”, since the fact that this 
brain structure should give rise to the experience of (seemingly) temporal asymmetry is explain within a 
physicalist theory of mind. 
25 For example, supporters of certain versions of non-reductive physicalism maintain that the fact that 
certain physical kinds realize certain high-level kinds is brute; see for example Fodor 1974, 1997. 
26 Callender seems to believe that nothing calls for explanation in this epistemic sense. His reasoning, 
however, is unconvincing. He argues that improbability is insufficient for calling for explanation and 
seems to think that there’s no other theoretical possibility for distinguishing between facts that call for 
explanation and facts that do not. While we agree that the improbability thesis is a non-starter, there are 
several alternatives to explore. See Baras (2019; unpublished). 
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This view is precisely the view that Callender argues against (not Price’s view), and rightly so. 
“Requires explanation” is here used in the epistemic sense (III), as a reason to reject a certain 
theory. However, the mere improbability of a state of affairs is not a sufficient reason to believe 
that it must be explainable. As Callender argues, improbable occurrences happen all the time that 
aren’t reason to doubt any of our theories. (Just toss a coin a few times, or count the blades of 
grass on your lawn. The specific result will surely be improbable and, arguably, brute). If we 
have any reason to believe that the Past State is unlikely to be a brute fact, it must be something 
other than, or at least in addition to, its improbability.27  Carroll, because he believes the Past 
State is unlikely to be brute, explains the low entropy Past State of our universe by taking our 
universe to be a “baby universe” within a universe for which the initial state is one of high 
entropy as well as of high probability. What are the reasons for believing that this is indeed the 
state in which the universe came into being? What assumptions go into endowing this initial state 
with high probability? In other words, what sort of explanation can be or should be provided for 
this initial state? We worry that Carroll’s theory avoids one boundary condition that calls for 
explanation (in the epistemic sense of calls for explanation) by positing another boundary 
condition, thus opening the question of whether that condition also calls for explanation. 
Whether or not this worry can be resisted is a question we leave open.  
Conclusion 
Our main task in this paper was to disambiguate, quite generally, what philosophers and 
scientists mean when they say of some fact that it calls for explanation. We have distinguished a 
 
27 Of course, even the claim that the Past State is improbable is contestable. In the context of possible 
boundary conditions of the universe, it is far from clear how probabilities should be determined.  
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number of possibilities. While they are not exhaustive, they give us a good place to start from 
when examining other such debates. Applying the result of this conceptual analysis for the case 
study of the Past State, and in particular for the debate between Callender and Price, prominent 
representatives of two sides of the debate on whether the Past State calls for explanation, we 
found that the two sides, at least as we understand them, not only talk past each other, but make, 
for the most part, compatible claims. More importantly, we have shown that analyzing the debate 
about the Past Hypothesis along the lines of the different meanings of “calling for explanation” 
can help us understand better the different arguments involved in this debate, and thus make 
progress in investigating the debate’s subject matter in the philosophical foundations of physics.  
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